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The concept of Aristotelian purity, concerning the objective–subjective debate, has 
been broadly treated from a plethora of perspectives. This lecture does not attempt to 
review such perspectives, but barely to analyze the Ingardean opposition of pure 
states of beings —particularly from the view of aesthetics— against a unstable notion 
of beings, whose ontologically fuzzy borders enable the concept of impurity. 
Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), a philosopher who developed and transformed 
many aspects of Husserlian phenomenology, conceived ontological stages of beings, 
similarly to physical states of matter in which a combination of quantities and 
qualities can be false or true in order to obtain a stable point of substances (see 
Wachter 2005:79–80). For Ingarden, substances appear on their immanent properties, 
but also they come clear from the kind of relationships they establish with other 
ontologies. This sort of phenomenology does make a radical difference regarding 
Husserl trascendental idealism, as Ingarden invites for a re-appraisal of the classical 
dialectics between realism and idealism, with a corresponding relationship between 
main and subsidiary meanings. 
Ingardean aesthetics are strongly based on the assumption that works of art do 
exist. Obviously, this belief is highly idiosyncratic. The concepts of work, art, and 
artwork —as they are understood by most of the modern tratises on the topic— are 
concepts tightly involved with the evolution of culture in the European countries and 
their historical extensions and areas of influence. In this context, imaginary and 
physically located musea are precincts for the artworks, which are milestones for the 
construction of idiosyncrasy, and the strengthening of cultural dominance. A good 
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example of this is the preservation of the standard meter rod in Paris, which usually is 
not considered a work of art, but has an analogous function of objective reference, 
like a masterpiece. Many other objects can similarly be mentioned as imaginary and 
tangible sources for “objective” reference and dominance. 
Equivalent concepts of museum already have been explored and criticized by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in philosophy; by Rush Rhees in linguistics, and by William 
van Orman Quine, specifically in its semantic and ontological implications. After this 
criticism it can be abstracted that the supposed purity of ontologies is very depending 
on the kind of museum one desires to build, not necessarily as an inferential 
construction, but merely as an imposed form of reality, in the sense we impose words, 
symbols or objects to others. To this view, will and intentionality (as a power of will) 
are fundamental for understanding the interplay between objectivity and subjectivity, 
on construing aesthetic ontologies. 
Influenced by Hegel’s categories of Pure Being, Ingarden (1962, 1964) thinks that 
artworks exist in an ‘Objective purely intentional’ manner. According to this idea, 
objectivity and subjectivity are opposed forms of existence, parallel to the opposition 
between realism and idealism. Ingarden believes on intrinsec values of things, with 
‘pure-intentional’ qualifiers (cf. Gumpel 1994:25), by contrast to representational 
references. Consequently, Ingarden concerns about the kind of act that generates 
‘pure’ objectivity, as an act of meaning.1 Nevertheless, a doubt arises when 
considering a representation as a mental value in itself. This consideration, 
improbable in the Ingardean conceptualization, has indeed its own place as 
synecdoche: an efficient and pervasive device for the construction of both, objective 
and subjective perspectives on things. 
Synecdoche is a very basic transaction of the mind, importantly contributing to 
establish ontologies—in the Ingardean way of the term. Adam Wegrzecki (1994:220), 
a specialist on Ingarden’s aesthetic theories, defines ontology as “the central domain 
of philosophy to which other its parts directly or indirectly refer”. Thus, ontologies 
operate in philosophy as synecdoche does in language, pointing the sense of the 
general into the particular and viceversa. 
                                                 
1 Referred to as Meinungsakt in Ingarden 1931. 
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The many affinities and similarities among different sign systems, like those 
found across the interrelationships of arts, are embedded into a transversal, 
synecdochic intersemiosis. An important question, from this view, is whether 
Ingarden’s pure objectivities lie basically on the impossibility of translation, therefore 
being absolute self-referential constructions. In a such case, it would be impossible to 
translate pure intentional objectivities into something else. It might nonetheless be 
useful to consider that a same kind of act of meaning can also have twofold or 
manifold sorts of expression and representation. This is not to say only that an act of 
meaning can be interpreted through subjective ways. Rather, it is to point out that an 
act of meaning —even as a pure intentionality— can have the same kind of trigger 
another act of meaning has. If so, then a same state of the same mind can 
simultaneously produce compatible substages of meaning, in different, yet correlated 
networks. This is the very point of this lecture: since synesthesia and analogy are 
possible in this manner, then how can we consider a pure intentional stage a of mind-
object —e.g. a musical chord— independently from a simultaneous stage of another 
directly related mind-object —e.g. a visual, intuitive form of the same chord. A 
relevant question at this point is whether are there pure objectivities translatable into 
other pure objectivities. From the Ingardean point of view this is impossible. As a 
matter of fact, Ingarden (1962:229) does not talk about any intersemiotic translation 
between arts, but about a ‘kinship’ (verwandtschaft) or ‘reconstruction mean’ 
(Rekonstruktionsmittel) between different aesthetic fields. 
At the beginning of this lecture I promised I would not go forward into the so 
discussed Aristotelian purity of beings. Nevertheless, I would like to call your 
attention to the idea of phisical purity, very popular during the Ingarden formative 
period as intellectual. I address, therefore, not to Aristotle nor to any Peripatetic 
philosopher, but to an influential thinker who published many articles on music 
philosophy before Ingarden’s ontology of artworks: 
[T]he Greeks were a Southern people, on whose temperaments the purely 
physical experience of music, especially of singing, would be far more direct and 
far more powerful than it is upon people like ourselves whose Northern 
temperament has in the course of centuries developed a more consciously 
intellectual attitude towards the art. 
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This is Edward J. Dent (1928:313) words; the sort of mandatory source for any 
European aesthetician writing on music during the World Between Wars period. It is 
difficult to assert that Dent could directly influentiate Ingarden in this particular. But 
it is quite notorious that this Positivistic view on music was very generalized in those 
years, in which physicality of things —including biological and geographical issues— 
embraced the meaning of aesthetic and cultural values. Presumably, Ingarden could 
keep this kind of focus during the development of his Ontology of Art (1962). 
However, one may see Ingarden effort to explain the existence of things                    
—particularly the aesthetic heteronomies, in the light of his own ultimate ideas, in 
which he considers a germinal notion of translation rather as an efficient reorientation 
of the senses, from the ordinary similarities perceived in the world, towards the 
original heteronomies of the world.2 If we consider these heteronomies as memories, 
then the Ingardean dichotomy between Objectivity and Subjectivity can sufficiently 
be assimilated to a problem of translatability. 
Contemplating the most general features of aesthetic phenomena, realism and 
idealism cannot be pure oppositions but aspects of a single process of cognition in 
different strata.3 Furthermore, realism can be resumed as an empirical extreme of 
idealism, and idealism can be resumed as a pre-operative extreme of realism. Both 
kind of systems of knowledge are mutually associated by a synecdoche, featuring 
main tasks of mental order and categorisation. Consequently, one may suggest that the 
supposed opposition between objectivity and subjectivity, raises a problem of 
existential categories, not in absolute terms, but in terms of affinity and self-affinity 
between cognitive domains and mental spaces. 
Last but not least, it must be stressed that Ingardean ‘purity’ should be regarded 
very appart from the Aristotelian one: Ingarden explicitly recognizes as “pure 
objective ontologies” those qualities that remain untouchable in translation. This point 
is also clear in Roman Jakobson; for him there is “something that dissappears” in 
every translation; “something remains”, but something is completely gone with 
                                                 
2 This idea (Ingarden 1962:319) appears originally in the following words: “Infolgedessen hat der Zuschauer es 
nicht direkt mit Personen, Dingen und Vorgängen zu tun, sondern lediglich mit deren „Abbildern“. Indessen: 
indem der Zuschauer diese Abbilder erfaßt, stellt er sich unwillkürlich auf das Abgebildete selbst ein, sieht in 
den Bildern die betreffenden Personen und Dinge selbst, ohne sich ausdrücklich zum Bewußtsein zu bringen, 
daß diese Gegenstände ihm, streng genommen, nicht selbstgegenwärtig sind.” 
3 Ingarden usually admits too few strata (Schichten) for his aesthetic theory on “pure objective intentionalities”. 
This fact has been noticed as a hindrance for its development and analytical application (see for example 
Simons 1994:138–139, and Thomasson 2005:36–37). 
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translation: what is gone, according to Ingarden, is ‘ontological purity’. From this 
perspective, for any translation a lost purity may have been obliterated by another 
‘pure ontology’. Purity, in this case, should be understood as a deviation from 
homology, and as a stage in a process of self-affinity, within its variated degrees of 
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